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ABSTRACT
Studying the implications of the bilateral agreements between the Republic of 
Panama and the People’s Republic of China of 2017 allows us to understand the 
economic and political effects of Chinese diplomacy on international cooperation, 
economic development, and soft power under the principles of trust and mutual 
benefit. The objective is to theorise the possible risks of the various aspects of 
these agreements; expand or modify their terms, ideally, if desirable; promote all 
sectors’ participation; and collect scientific evidence to make the agreements easier 
for decision-makers to evaluate. Maintaining complex, interdependent relationships 
with different spheres of power requires prioritising national interests and adapting 
them to the new global reality of the COVID-19 pandemic, which requires adjusting 
agreements on grounds other than the Belt and Road’s specific objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the process of establishing diplomatic relations, the declarations of the Chinese authorities make clear the objective of guaranteeing through the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), using Panama as a strategic platform and gateway to Latin America, and accessing the Panama Canal (Mendez & Alden, 2021).
Chinese soft power diplomacy, applied ever since 2004 by Hu Jintao and his successors, ambitiously 
“encompasses politics, culture, economy, cultural exchange; which is also promoted through the presence 
of the Chinese population in the world, which allows strengthening cultural and economic ties with greater 
acceptance and propagation, reinforced by the government’s policy of spreading their culture” (Herrera, 
Montenegro, & Torres-Lista, 2019).
Panama undertook the signing of agreements with the Asian giant in an accelerated way that placed 
it at a disadvantage. It left a pall of doubt over whether real benefits would accrue to Panamanians, given 
the experience of Chinese economic statecraft by other countries. Chinese lending has been attractive to 
developing countries seeking new markets; they have obtained financing for large-scale projects, promotion 
of trade, economic stimulus, and knowledge transfer, all of them essential axes of International Development 
Cooperation. Some have called this strategy “debt diplomacy”: readily giving loans in order to gain political 
not just economic influence, and thereby geostrategic power (Choque, 2020).
In what one might call good mirages of Panamanian progress give rise to unpayable indebtedness and 
homologous conquest facts in America. One will face a modern exchange of mirrors for precious goods. It 
is not an innocent principle or an exercise in charitable donation, but a strategy that assumes consistency 
in ethical principles creates its own influence in international relations. Soft power, reinforced by economic 
expansion, can decisively contribute to lending China’s global prestige (Ríos Paredes, 2011).
Some cases illustrate this type of diplomacy, according to Choque (2020); e.g., since 2005 China has made 
loans to Venezuela and other Latin American countries for large infrastructure and energy projects, being so 
before 2017 Latin America indebtedness to China amounted to about US$150,000. The project financing was 
subject to a series of conditions, such as contracting Chinese companies for their execution, which further 
promoted imports of capital goods from China. The loans became vehicles of Chinese political and social 
influence over these countries, rendering them preferential partners for exploitation of natural resources. 
Chinese power expansion has put Panama on the map because of its geostrategic position and developed 
international maritime trade through the Panama Canal. China’s practices in the execution of agreements with 
other countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, Sri Lanka and others arouse suspicion in some quarters over the way 
47 detailed agreements were signed on wide-ranging issues without consultation, all aimed at carrying out 
China’s agenda of the Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road initiatives. This paper seeks to analyse different 
aspects that facilitate the accurate evaluation of what these commitments in signed agreements represent 
for Panama beyond expressions of friendship and goodwill.
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II. A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CHINA AND PANAMA
In 2017 and 2018 the government of Panamanian President Varela signed 47 agreements with the People’s 
Republic of China. In 2019, the new government of President Laurentino Cortizo closed negotiations with the 
signing of 3 new agreements, bringing the total to 50.
Many of these agreements are predicated on sweeping promises, for example, among the objectives 
indicated in the economic agreement is to formalise bilateral assistance policy on the grounds that it will 
attract investment from China to Panama and facilitate the opening of the Chinese market to Panamanian 
exports. This was the Panamanian government’s main justification for terminating relations with China-
Taiwan and forging new connections with the People’s Republic of China. In the economic, commercial, and 
investment areas, a joint committee chaired by the two countries’ trade ministers was set up to strengthen 
and promote bilateral cooperation and examine the progress of various projects.
Panama already had a robust banking sector, hence China introduced into the agreements the objective of 
a collaboration platform on financial matters, which routinises communication and information exchange in 
economic, commercial, and investment matters. This was sold as a facility for financing large infrastructure 
projects, such as highways, bridges, power plants, airports, port facilities, logistics parks, among others. 
This also included the building of the China Development Bank headquarters in Panama and mechanisms of 
cooperation with China Exim Bank.
China is a primary driver of world trade and plays a vital role in Latin America’s international financial 
sector (Fornes & Mendez, 2018). It is the first destination market for exports from Brazil and Chile and the 
second for Peru, Cuba, and Costa Rica. China is also the third most important importer of goods from Latin 
America and the Caribbean, with a value of 13% of total imports from the region. In turn, Latin America and 
the Caribbean have become a prominent destination of Chinese foreign direct investment (Rosales & Mikio, 
2012). 
In terms of cooperation for development, areas of common interest included the construction and operation 
of infrastructure; the service sector, including ship navigation; industrial and economic cooperation zones; 
manufacturing; agriculture and food processing; and others. Since no one in either government consulted 
with the affected sectors or considered the priorities of the Panamanian national sustainable development 
agenda, these bilateral agreements certainly reflect the interests of China, but leave the effect on the interests 
of Panama unclear.
A prime example is the 2018 Framework Agreement for Cooperation in Science, Technology, and 
Innovation, that has a shared cost modality. It contributes little to the Panamanian vision for the advancement 
of science, technology, innovation and research contained in the PENCYT 2019-2024, which mandates a 
comprehensive review to adapt such undertakings to the overall national development strategy. It should be 
noted additionally that the COVID-19 pandemic has since incorporated new science and research priorities 
into the national interest.
Phytosanitary and agricultural issues that are of strategic importance in terms of food safety ought 
to be subjected to public consultation and full transparency procedures before Panama commits itself to 
exports of food of plant or animal origin to a market as big as China, and without first adopting an agricultural 
policy that guarantees Panamanian food sovereignty (that is, that the people of Panama should have priority 
in consumption of Panamanian produce). This requires a review of customs regulations to ensure the 
compliance of any bilateral agreements with general health and export legislation. The previous experience 
of Free Trade Agreements (Mexico, State of Israel, Chile, United States) cautions prudence, because one 
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signs agreements without first securing adequate conditions in the concerned sectors. This has made it 
challenging to exploit such marketing opportunities, the demands of which exceed the existing capacities of 
Panamanian agro-industry.
On a sensitive issue such as electrification, the bilateral agreements indicate that the Bank of China will 
support the Government of Panama in financing investment projects in electrical transmission, potentially 
including long-term credit facilities to finance the investment plan of ETESA, Panama’s parastatal electricity 
utility, which opens the door to unsustainable indebtedness with well-known consequences that have been 
called the “debt trap” (Mendez & Alden, 2019).
On the positive side, the bilateral agreements on air transport, ratified in Panama by the Law of 23 on 
March 20, 2018, facilitates the establishment of direct air routes. With each nation choosing up to three 
destinations in the other. This has opened opportunities for commercial and cargo flights, but the traffic 
rights to be granted are linked to national security, therefore, it is essential to inform oneself on the technical 
position of the experts before regulating or negotiating other routes.
The Maritime Transport Agreement states that vessels with Panamanian registration are to receive 
privileges in Chinese ports; also, there is to be reciprocal recognition of the titles of seafarers issued by 
Panama and by China and their temporary disembarkation at the time of touching ports. In both nations. 
According to its Maritime Authority, Panama still has the largest ship registry globally, with 18% of the world’s 
fleet. It is necessary to analyse the effects on Panama of more than 8 thousand merchant ships recognising 
seafarers’ titles widely and what further regulation can do.
In addition, it must be borne in mind that international maritime trade does not escape the political reality 
of the great powers, which maintain claims on naval routes. In October 2020 international newspapers 
reported that US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo concluded a tour of five Asian countries by leaving a clear 
message that the United States opposes Chinese encroachments on the sovereign maritime territories of 
the nations of Southeast Asia, Asia, and the Indo-Pacific region. The US State Department also criticised 
China for reneging on its promises to nations concerning its territorial claims in the South China Sea, where 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan have as good, if not better claims to the territory. A 
third of all world maritime transport passes through this Sea (including ships flagged Panamanian) making 
it a geostrategic location. The current geopolitical scene cannot be ignored when negotiating these bilateral 
agreements, which may be compromising if conflict affects the relations Panama has with other countries, 
given its strategic position and historical relations with the United States (Mendez, 2021). 
In this context, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation within the Framework of the 
Economic Belt of the Silk Road and the Maritime Initiative of the Silk Road of the 21st century constitutes 
the most relevant document for China. Panama’s adherence enhances Chinese strategy in Latin America, 
through the Panama Canal that facilitates connectivity by its commercial and economic presence, land 
routes, maritime, and cultural, included in the various agreements signed.
Many people are purported to be benefitted, considering its non-reimbursable cooperation, by the 
Cooperation for Personal Development agreements. These agreements include training for journalists, 
human resources contemplated in the National Cooperation Plan (Panama Coopera), funding to the 
educational sector, cultural exchanges and improvements to the state Radio and Television System. But not 
included in these agreements is personnel in science, research and technology, and other sectors that require 
strengthening human resources for greater economic and technical competitiveness.
Among the first agreements signed with China were on diplomatic matters, establishing a political consultation 
mechanism between both countries, the Panamanian Consulate in Shanghai and China’s in Panama, and the 
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abolition of visas on passports of diplomats, services officers and consulates facilitating the exchange of 
official visits. Given all of the foregoing, it is imperative to consult and actually listen to the recommendations 
of Panamanian specialists, academics, and sectoral associations and to rethink how these agreements benefit 
Panama, or not. What specifically does one need from this bilateral relationship? What are the implications 
of supporting a hegemonic political program such as the BRI? And do the agreements promoting tourism, 
the supposed opening of new markets, and sustainable financing for megaprojects align strategically with 
national development policies? We have to define what are Panama’s national priorities with more attention 
to strategic detail. It is the State’s responsibility to safeguard the national interest in bilateral agreements, and 
to preserve Panama’s culture, values, democracy, security, sovereignty, and respect for human rights. These 
are the principles that ought to be reflected in all bilateral agreements.
Table No. 1
47 Agreements signed between Panama and China 2017-2018 Government of Juan Carlos Varela.
1. Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
2.  Agreement on the conversion of commercial representations accredited in the other party into embassies.
3. Agreement for the mutual suppression of visas in diplomatic, service, official and consular passports.
4. Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the political consultation mechanism.
5. Agreement on the establishment of the Consulate General of Panama in Shanghai.
6. Framework Agreement between the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Republic of Panama and the National 
Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China to promote production capacity and 
investment cooperation.
7. Agreement regarding the organization of a press workshop in China. (exchange of notes.)
8. Memorandum of Understanding on strategic cooperation between the China Development Bank and the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance of Panama.
9. Memorandum of understanding on cooperation mechanism between the Export-Import Bank of China and the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Republic of Panama.
10. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Republic of Panama and 
the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade.
11. Memorandum of Understanding on strategic cooperation between Empresa de Distribución Eléctrica, S.A. de 
Panamá (ETESA) and Banco de China  (Bank of China Limited).
12. Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation between Empresa de Distribución Eléctrica, S.A. of 
Panama (ETESA) and the Export and Import Bank of China (CEXIM).
13. Memorandum of Understanding on agricultural cooperation between the Ministry of Agricultural Development 
of the Republic of Panama and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China.
14. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Agricultural Development of the Republic of Panama 
and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of 
China in the area of  sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
15. Memorandum of Understanding between the government of the Republic of Panama and the government of 
the People’s Republic of China on the establishment of the Mixed Commission for economic, commercial and 
investment cooperations.
16. Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between the government of the Republic of Panama and the 
government of the People’s Republic of China.
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17. Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in the field of the rail transport system between the government 
of the Republic of Panama and the government of the People’s Republic of China.
18. Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in economic and commercial zones between the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industries of the Republic of Panama and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China.
19. Memorandum of Understanding between the government of the Republic of Panama and the government of 
the People’s Republic of China on cooperation in the framework of the economic belt of the Silk Road and the 
Maritime Silk Road of the XXI Century.
20. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Commerce and Industries of the Republic of Panama 
and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China for the initiation of the joint feasibility study for 
a free trade agreement between Panama and China.
21. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Panama and the government of the People’s Republic of 
China, regarding civil air transport. approved by Law No. 23 of March 20, 2018. Official Gazette No. 28492-a of 
March 27, 2018, which entered into force on April 4, 2018.
22. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Panama and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China on maritime transport. Approved by Law No. 24 of March 20, 2018. Official Gazette No. 28492-a of March 
27, 2018.
23. Memorandum of Understanding between the Tourism Authority of Panama and the National Tourism 
Administration of the People’s Republic of China on the facilitation of group trips by Chinese tourists to Panama.
24. Memorandum of Understanding on the strengthening of cultural cooperation between the National Institute 
of Culture (now the Ministry of Culture) of the Republic of Panama and the Ministry of Culture of the People’s 
Republic of China.
25. Cooperation Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Panama and the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China to carry out feasibility studies for railway projects in the Republic 
of Panama.
26. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Panama and the government of the People’s Republic of 
China on the leasing of real estate and land for the headquarters of the embassies. Approved by Law No. 22 of 
March 20, 2018. Official Gazette No. 28492-a of March 27, 2018.
27. Agreement regarding non-reimbursable economic cooperation of 100, 000,000.00 yuan of renminbi provided by 
the People’s Republic of China to finance cooperation projects in the Republic of Panama.
28. Agreement regarding the implementation of the feasibility study of the railway project from the province of 
Panama to the province of Chiriquí.
29. Treaty between the Republic of Panama and the People’s Republic of China on extradition.
30. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Panama and the government of the People’s Republic of 
China on educational cooperation.
31. Agreement between the government of the Republic of Panama and the government of the People’s Republic of 
China on the granting of multiple entry visas for ordinary passport holders.
32. Framework Agreement for Cooperation in science, technology and innovation between the government of the 
Republic of Panama and the government of the People’s Republic of China.
33. Cultural Cooperation Agreement between the government of the Republic of Panama and the government of the 
People’s Republic of China.
34. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of the Environment of the Republic of Panama and the 
Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China. 
35. Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between the government of the Republic of Panama and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China.
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36. Memorandum of Understanding between the Maritime Authority of Panama and the Ministry of Transportation 
of the People’s Republic of China on maritime cooperation.
37. Protocol on phytosanitary requirements for the export of fresh pineapples from Panama to China between the 
Ministry of Agricultural Development of the Republic of Panama and the general administration of customs of 
the People’s Republic of China.
38. Protocol between the Ministry of Agricultural Development of the Republic of Panama and the General 
Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China on inspection, quarantine and veterinary sanitary 
requirements for Cobia and Black Skipjack will be imported from the Republic of Panama to the People’s Republic 
of China.
39. Protocol between the Ministry of Agricultural Development of the Republic of Panama and the General 
Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China on inspection, quarantine and veterinary sanitary 
requirements for the export of meat from Panama to China.
40. Memorandum of Understanding on radio and television cooperation between the State Radio and Television 
System of the Republic of Panama and the State Administration of Radio and Television of the People’s Republic 
of China.
41. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Commerce and Industries of the Republic of Panama 
and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on cooperation in electronic commerce.
42. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Commerce and Industries of the Republic of Panama 
and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on cooperation in trade in services.
43. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Commerce and Industries of the Republic of Panama 
and the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) on the co-organization of the XIII 
China-Lac Business Summit.
44. Exchange of Letters on cooperation in the development of human resources. (4 courses).
45. Memorandum of Understanding between the National Bank of Panama and the Development Bank of China.
46. Memorandum of Understanding between the National Bank of Panama and the Bank of China. 
47. Framework Agreement between the Electric Transmission Company S.A. of the Republic of Panama and China 
Export & Insurance Corporation.
Source: Prepared by the authors with information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Panama.
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As stated by Herrera, Montenegro, and Torres Lista (2019), of the total 47 agreements, whether denominated 
MoU, Exchange of Notes, protocols, Agreements or Treaties, adopted without broad citizen consultation, 
most of them respond to the strategic interests and agenda of China. 
Among the documents signed with China between 2017 and 2018, it is important to highlight the 
Memorandum of Understanding on BRI, of December 11, 2017, which is motivated to “strengthen bilateral 
cooperation to jointly build the Economic Belt of the Route of the Silk and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st 
Century by fostering closer commercial and economic ties”.
The plans and vision of One China is part of the international cooperation policy of the signed bilateral 
documents. Yet, these agreements were hastily negotiated, no publicly debated rationale is known to support 
the decisions, beyond promised access to a gigantic market. Panama’s national vision is unknown, and that 
does not count the absence of many national sectors intricated in the various themes of the agreements, and 
the lack of consultation and transparency for the citizens of Panama concerning the political implications 
that the commitment to jointly build the One Belt, One Road will have for Panama.
In the Maritime Cooperation Agreement, Panama has committed itself to the Joint Development of the 
Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century, which is reiterated in the bespoke BRI MoU. Becoming a manifestation 
of will that expresses China’s interest in concretising its strategic programme, which, due to its possible 
implications in international politics, ought not to be implemented without the advice and the consent of the 
Panama Canal Authority and specialists in the maritime area.
China’s keenness to sign bilateral agreements is to materialise the BRI as a reality: to obtain access to 
natural resources and consumer markets for its products in Latin America. In this sense, Panama must put 
more effort into negotiations. The implementation of the 50 signed agreements, the vision of the country, and 
its development policies and priorities in the current geopolitical and economic context cannot well proceed 
without the participation of an informed citizenry and of the strategic actors linked to the issues if Panama-
China relations would result in sustainable development. This is especially critical taking into account that, 
after the COVID-19 pandemic, social inequalities have deepened. Human development is a priority hand in 
hand with economic development, thus Panama’s international development cooperation policy requires 
consideration of this new reality.
Most of the bilateral agreements stipulate a term of five years with possibility of renewal. This aspect is 
essential as it would be irresponsible for the government to neglect the necessary evaluation and consultation 
processes, only to reach the end and be subjected to unfavourable scrutiny.
The environmental issue is vital for Panama. There is a responsibility to overcome any disadvantage, 
bear in mind the different public policies in force on this matter, the seas, wetlands, water sources, species 
protection, among others. In the environmental agreement signed with China, eleven articles were agreed-to. 
Supervising institutional operations in ecological matters is highlighted, related explicitly to hydrographic, 
aquatic, coastal-marine areas, and freshwater basins. These are essential issues for the sustainable 
development of the country. No previous scientific studies allow us to establish such a need, especially 
as one is talking about operations or operational activities directly and indirectly linked to the Canal Zone. 
Another implication for the environment relates to the activities and income generated around these activities 
(artisanal, commercial fishery, ecotourist) and their impacts on the environment and the population.
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In agricultural and industrial matters, although the agreements in theory mandate access to China’s 
markets, one encounters the reality of a sector that has not received proper government attention, so that 
an agro-industrial policy is lacking. There needs to be policies that would cover access to mechanisms 
of financing, technology issues, clear export rules, human resources preparation and training facilities, 
scientific laboratories, transportation systems and refrigeration, and technical sufficiency to compete with 
the requirements of the international market. What actual benefits can then be expected from such bilateral 
agreements for which the country is so unprepared? 
After the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, export to China began to be reactivated. Since 
June 2019, the Carnes de Coclé company has been among the first to export meat to China. In 2019 it approved 
building two plants to manufacture export beef: Unión Ganadera, SA (Ungasa), operated by Carnes de Coclé, 
and Fortunato Mangravita, S.A. (Tejeira, 2020). Sales of beef have earned about US$5.4 million for Panama, 
not a spectacular amount, however it is necessary to watch the development of these exports to make sure 
that they do not pre-empt the supply of meat available to Panama’s inland market.
A comparative study of the Free Trade Agreements negotiated by Latin America with the People’s Republic 
of China, India, Singapore, and Taiwan and of the FTAs  of Peru and Chile, by the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture, points out among lessons to be learned from the two FTAs signed with China with 
the topic of cooperation must be taken full advantage of, not just the rules relating to commercial exchange 
(IICA, 2009). In negotiating the FTA in Costa Rica, for example, it became clear that one of the most significant 
challenges was to achieve the diversification of its export offering, that is, to bring more products to the 
Chinese market. This is one of the issues on which Panama must be preparing itself in this sector.
In the case of the FTA between Panama and China, despite the previous government having advanced five 
rounds of negotiations, the succeeding President of The Republic announced on social media the freezing 
of the FTA negotiations with China during the XIII China-Latin America and the Caribbean Business Summit 
(XIII China-LAC) in December 2019. Notwithstanding China’s growing interest in expanding bilateral trade 
with LAC. During an international press conference, President Laurentino Cortizo Cohen promised that the 
government would review the agreements “carefully and cautiously” for a change (Telemetro Reporta, 2019).
The agricultural sector must participate more in the processes of negotiation and implementation of 
protocols. The agricultural industry is concerned that Chinese labour could enter in a massive way into these 
negotiations. Yet the Ministry of Commerce has assured that it is seeking to guarantee preferential treatment 
for Panamanian agricultural, fishing, and agro-industrial products with more significant potential (Garrido A, 
2018).
Unlike Costa Rica, Panama did not open the FTA to public consultation with the different sectors of the 
economy (America, 2008). In statements to the newspaper Panamá América, Augusto Jiménez, the former 
President of the Association of Highlands said, “It is very worrying when the Highlands unions are not taken 
into account because China has a flawed phytosanitary system and Panama is very permissive. Two factors 
that put us in an inoperative situation”. For his part, Nodier Díaz, Secretary of the Federation of Rice and Grains 
of Panama said, “We are concerned about the prior control that does not exist, the principle of reciprocity in 
governments so that the same conditions are applied, the lack of sufficient laboratories and the human team 
prepared for these controls, and an Aupsa that only sees products on shelves” (Castillo, 2018).
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Panama’s Ministry of Commerce and Industries announced on social media at the end of August 2019 that 
no dates had been set for new rounds of negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement that seeks to limit the 
exchange of agricultural goods. This means it is a partial-scope FTA, negotiations for which have been put on 
hold due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Most of the agreements bear implications for Panama’s sustainable development and its economic, 
commercial, and financial position, and its international relations. Undoubtedly, these negotiation frameworks 
that are automatically expanded impose on our authorities the responsibility of making further analyses and 
consulting all sectors involved, making information available transparently and seeking scientific evidence, to 
have more tools with which to protect the national interest.
China continues to indicate its interest and is waiting for the Panamanian government to resume the 
FTA negotiations (Hérnandez V, 2021), and maintains an interest in expanding its presence in Latin America 
through International Development Cooperation. These 50 agreements already signed, are a significant 
achievement in its political and economic strategy.
The government of President Cortizo prudently heeds various sectors when they claim and decide 
to pause the negotiations to analyse progress made so far. As Berjano and others point out about FTAs 
signed by China with Latin America, the motivations for these FTAs, even more so in the Pacific, are not only 
commercial in its aims but also geopolitical (Ramón Berjano, Malena, & Vellosos, 2015).
The signing of the Agreement on Plant Inspection and Quarantine, and the two Protocols for the export of 
aquatic and pork products, achieve a commercial opening in agricultural matters with China, despite the fact 
that the negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement are suspended. They were signed by Augusto Valderrama, 
Minister of Agricultural Development, and Rosario Turner, Minister of Health of Panama, and by China; Hu 
Wei, Vice Minister of the General Administration of Customs. As reported by the TVN2 news channel (TVN 
Noticias Channel 2, 2019).
With the signing of these protocols, previous agreements on agricultural matters are complemented, and a 
series of product quality requirements and veterinary sanitary standards are added by both countries. Again, 
the benefit to Panamanians is limited here. Other requirements on the conditions and facilities for handling, 
transport, storage and packaging of these products, will hardly benefit small producers if they do not have 
access to technology, aid and state resources, so that their exports can adjust to the agreed requirements.
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The following table incorporates the general contents of these agreements signed with China.
Table No.2.
Agreements between Panama and China- 2019. 
Government of Laurentino Cortizo Cohen.
DATE LEGAL INSTRUMENT CONTENT
It was signed on 
December 10, 2019. It 
came into force from 
that date, for five years, 
automatically extended. 
It may be modified at 
any time by the parties.
Published in the Official 
Digital Gazette No. 28924 
of December 19, 2019.
Cooperation Agreement 
for Plant Inspection and 
Quarantine between the 
Ministry of Agricultural 
Development of the Republic 
of Panama and the General 
Administration of Customs of 
the People’s Republic of China.
Bilateral cooperation for biosafety in-plant 
inspection and quarantine to facilitate 
and expedite commercial exchange.
It includes information exchange, visits, 
technologies, and experiences on the subject, 
seminars, research, and pest prevention.
It was signed on December 
10, 2019. It contains the 
same clauses as the 
Cooperation for Plant 
Inspection and Quarantine, 
mentioned above.
Published in the Official 
Digital Gazette No. 28924 
of December 19, 2019.
Protocol between the Ministry 
of Agricultural Development of 
the Republic of Panama and 
the General Administration 
of Customs on inspection, 
quarantine, and veterinary 
sanitary requirements 
for aquatic products to 
be imported * from the 
Republic of Panama to the 
People’s Republic of China.
* Correct term is export as 
it appears in the annex.
They refer to aquatic animal products 
and their products, caught in the wild or 
cultivated, processed / or preserved as 
frozen, refrigerated, dried, smoked, and other 
processes suitable for human consumption. 
Live aquatic animals and production materials 
are not included. The list of exported marine 
products is attached to the Protocol.
It was signed on December 
10, 2019, under the same 
conditions of validity of the 
previous legal instruments.
Published in Official 
Digital Gazette No. 28924 
of December 19, 2019.
Protocol between the Ministry 
of Agricultural Development, 
the Ministry of Health of the 
Republic of Panama, and 
the General Administration 
of Customs on inspection, 
quarantine, and veterinary 
sanitary requirements for 
the export of pigs from the 
Republic of Panama to the 
People’s Republic of China.
Establishes Panama’s responsibilities for the 
quality and requirements of pork and veterinary 
health compliance with both Ministry of 
Agricultural Development (MIDA) and Ministry 
of Health (MINSA). It also includes complying 
with Chinese standards in packaging, storage, 
and transportation and will be accompanied by 
veterinary certifications in Chinese, Spanish, 
and English. If the General Administration of 
Customs of the People’s Republic of China 
(GACC) determines that it does not comply 
with the Protocol, it will notify MINSA for the 
product’s return, destruction, or disposal.
Source: Own elaboration, based on information obtained from the Ministry of Agricultural Development (MIDA).  
https://www.mida.gob.pa/ 
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Agriculture together with the Ministry of Health 
are making progress on the implementation of these latest agreements concerning the export of pork and 
aquatic products. According to the Chinese ambassador to Panama, sanitary protocols for the export of 
products such as coffee, beef, pineapple, fish and shrimp have been accomplished. With the pork protocols 
also advancing the approval process for processing plants to export to China (Cigarruista, 2020).
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III.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
The 47 agreements between the Republic of Panama and the People’s Republic of China in 2017 and 2018 
and the three agreements in 2019 result from strategic diplomacy in international cooperation policy, planned 
under One China and the BRI, where Panama becomes China’s gateway in its relations with other countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. With the conclusion of these agreements, Panama becomes part of China’s 
regional power expansion map, contributing the strategic position of the Panama Canal and the development 
of its international maritime trade.
The agreements have different socio-economic implications for Panama’s sustainable development, 
its economic, commercial, and financial position, and its international relations. Historically, Panama has 
maintained a thriving banking system, with the support of regional and national organisations and private 
companies. Yet these bilateral financial agreements strengthen the economic-financial structure of China, 
promoting the expansion of their banks, which aim at becoming the primary sources of financing for the 
Panamanian State for large-scale infrastructure and energy works. This clearly bears the risk of debt diplomacy.
The current Cortizo government has expressed an interest in reviewing the agreements signed by its 
predecessor and in negotiating cautiously to protect the national interests in any FTAs. This should allow new 
opportunities to incorporate views from sectoral representatives, specialists and academic experts.
To properly evaluate the implications of these agreements, one must study employment effects, natural 
resources use, economic regulation, the needs of development in science, research, and technology based on 
the National Strategic Plan for Science, Technology, and Innovation (PENCYT), prepare national infrastructure 
in agribusiness, define more clearly the country’s political position in national forums on maritime issues, 
taking into account conflicts, and that we are governed by the principle of neutrality in the Panama Canal. 
One must also analyse the investments financed by Chinese capital, whether they bring real benefits for the 
population, sustainable development, and reflect the strategic interests of the country. Whilst also ensuring 
that all agreements are in line with the country’s post-COVID-19 needs.
A priority is to follow a political strategy of disseminating information to the entire population for the sake 
of the transparency and accountability of the State’s commitments in terms of International Development 
Cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China. 
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